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Summary: This article seeks to explain the emergence of the European Council at the heart 
of Europe’s governance between 1975 and 1986. It highlights four factors that quickly made 
the newly-created institution both indispensable and stable, despite concerns over the 
excessive reliance on the intergovernmental method in European cooperation processes. 
These factors were the rise of globalisation in its multi-faceted policy dimensions; a 
satisfactory new-found institutional balance; the public impact of/societal actors’ connections 
with regular and frequent heads of government’s meetings; and the democratic legitimacy 
issue in European integration. The article further argues that this period witnessed the de facto 
emergence of the three-pillar Maastricht structure, and shows how the study of the early days 
of the EEC can shed light on the current development of the EU and the European Council 
after the 2009 Lisbon Treaty. 
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 2 
Introduction 
 
“It more and more seems to me that, on an institutional level, the European Council is not 
only unnecessary but, to a certain extent, harmful.”1 Less than two years after the decision to 
regularise EEC heads of governments’ meetings this is how Pierre Gueben, civil servant in 
charge of organising European Council meetings at the General Secretariat of the European 
Economic Community (EEC)’s Council of Ministers, criticised the emergence of the new 
institution. About forty years later, reading such a statement is quite surprising, at a time 
when repeated European Union (EU) summit emergency meetings, ad nauseam media 
coverage of those, and spicy details on the latest bon mot of a European leader are part of the 
EU’s everyday life. But when a European Council meeting was unable to reach an agreement, 
the practice itself of regular meetings at heads of government’s level was easily called into 
question. Gueben thus made his recrimination against the European Council in July 1976, 
shortly after the unsuccessful meeting of April 1976 that took place in Luxembourg. Yet the 
centrality of the European Council in today’s EU should not be allowed to obscure that the 
European Council’s evolution into a prominent institution of the EU’s governance was not as 
predetermined as it could seem, with the benefit of hindsight.  
 
When the heads of government of the EEC agreed, on 10 December 1974 in Paris, to hold 
regular and frequent meetings between themselves, this decision was something of an 
experiment.2 Legally, this new type of meeting was based on an uncodified and non binding                                                         
1 Central Archives of the Council of the European Union, Brussels (hereafter CMA), HICA.H.CM2 CEE, 
CEEA.1976.2.2, Gueben to Hommel, Conseil européen des 12-13 juillet 1976, 6 July 1976. 
2 On the decision to create the European Council see Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol, ‘Filling the EEC Leadership 
Vacuum? The Creation of the European Council in 1974’, Cold War History, 10, 3 (2010), 315–339; John 
Young, ‘The Summit Is Dead. Long Live the European Council’: Britain and the Question of Regular Leaders’ 
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decision, that is, the communiqué of the 1974 Paris summit. Long-standing critiques against 
the decision-making system of the EEC and a growing frustration with the lack of leadership 
in the Community as a whole encouraged the French government to push for the 
institutionalisation of meetings at heads of government level. The French government – 
joined in this by the bigger member states – considered that the existing different kinds of 
Council of Ministers’ meetings needed some form of pulling together at the top. After a few 
months of negotiations in late 1974, the heads of governments agreed at the Paris summit of 
December of that same year to create the ‘European Council’. The uncodified nature of the 
European Council was, Britain apart, largely foreign to the EEC member states’ constitutional 
traditions, and did little to clarify the (legal) debate over its role and functions. Reminiscences 
of the Gaullist period fed the ‘smaller’ EEC member states’ scepticism towards the European 
Council: regular summitry was seen as endangering the Community (supranational) method. 
Any unsuccessful meeting – such as the April 1976 session in Luxembourg that partly 
motivated Gueben’s berating of the European Council – could vindicate misgivings about the 
value of holding summit meetings on such a regular and frequent basis.  
 
Twelve years later however, any remaining doubts and criticisms against the European 
Council had by and large vanished. First of all, a number of landmarks seemed to confirm the 
usefulness of top-level leaders’ meetings. The very first meeting of the European Council in 
Dublin in March 1975 contributed to solve the British renegotiation issue; the triptych of 
European Council summits over the year of 1978, in Copenhagen, Bremen and Brussels, 
significantly shaped the creation of the European Monetary System (EMS); the Fontainebleau                                                                                                                                                                              
Meetings in the European Community, 1973-75’, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 44, 3 (2009), 219–238; 
Matthias Waechter, Helmut Schmidt und Valéry Giscard d’Estaing: auf der Suche nach Stabilität in der Krise 
der 70er Jahre (Bremen: Edition Temmen, 2011), 78–98; Béatrice Taulègne, Le Conseil européen (Paris: 
Presses universitaires de France, 1993), 61–87. 
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meeting in 1984 was instrumental in solving the British budgetary question; and the Milan 
meeting in 1985 paved the way for the future Treaty revision. The 1986 Single European Act 
(SEA) marked the first formal appearance of the European Council in an EEC treaty, albeit in 
a minimalistic fashion with only three sentences (Article 2, Title I) and no detail about its 
functions. Numerous European policymakers, regardless of their belonging to a specific 
political party, institution or member state, acknowledged the usefulness of the European 
Council in the EEC’s institutional set-up – without being blinded, of course, by its limits. 
Overall therefore, thanks to its important role in the above-mentioned landmarks as well as on 
other occasions, the European Council quickly placed itself at the centre of Europe’s 
governance, as a forum for both top-level deliberation and decision-making. 
 
How can one explain this tension, between a relatively uneasy creation, nurtured by various 
concerns about a greater orientation of EEC policymaking in favour of the intergovernmental 
method, and the European Council’s rapidly acquired centrality in the life of the EEC polity? 
This article argues that four intertwined factors account for this rapid and smooth emergence, 
in spite of some early misgivings about heads of governments’ meetings. First, the rise of 
globalisation, under all its guises – economic, environmental, financial, monetary, social – 
rendered regular and frequent meetings at heads of government’s level a necessary feature of 
European and international politics, in spite of all the frustrations to which such meetings 
could also give rise. Second, the new-found institutional balance in the EEC after the creation 
of the European Council proved satisfactory to the multiple actors involved in EEC 
policymaking, and thereby alleviated doubts about the exact role and functions of summit 
meetings. Third, the public impact of the European Council’s gatherings, especially in terms 
of media coverage and involvement of civil society/societal actors, contributed to make these 
meetings central and imperative in the EEC’s political life. Fourth, the perennial debates over 
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legitimacy in the EEC offered a window of opportunity for heads of government to attempt to 
re-politicise European debates – a situation which, in spite of its ambiguities, allowed 
institutionalised heads of government’s meetings to quickly become vital. All four factors 
made the European Council an indispensable actor in European governance, and indeed made 
it become a proper institution in the mindset of the many actors involved in European 
policymaking well before its formal successive treaty consecrations in 1986 (SEA), 1992 
(Maastricht) and 2007 (Lisbon). This article deliberately moves the focus away from the key 
individuals that took part in European Council meetings to look instead at the structural forces 
that explain the European Council’s rise in the EEC’s institutional set-up. This is not meant to 
imply an opposition of the two – individual vs. systemic forces – but instead to try to 
overcome a tendency of the literature on summits to fall into the trap of case-by-case study of 
the doings of purportedly visionary leaders. This article is not concerned with personal 
inclinations, but root causes and systemic analysis. The argument is based throughout on a 
large multi-lingual, multi-archival research, spanning over five countries (Britain, France, 
Germany, Ireland and Italy), and is the first article to use the archives of the European 
Council itself. This article is covering 35 European Councils over a twelve-year period, going 
from its inception in 1974 until the Single European Act in 1986.3  
 
In spite of the importance the European Council has quickly taken in the life of the EEC, the 
historical literature on the early years of the European Council is still very limited. Recent 
historiography on European integration made significant contributions to the understanding of 
the evolution of the EEC as an incipient polity, following in that earlier political science 
literature. But it has also tended to downplay intergovernmental bargaining, focusing instead 
on non-governmental actors, as if the intergovernmental and non-governmental trends had to                                                         
3 Three meetings per year were held until 1985; only two took place in 1986. 
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be seen in opposition, or even in isolation.4 This article reintroduces more firmly the role of 
national governments in the analysis, and demonstrates that these different strands – 
supranational, intergovernmental, transnational – often mutually reinforced each other: non-
governmental connections with the European Council reinforced heads of government 
meetings as an incipient institution of the EEC polity; the supranational European 
Commission took an active part in European Council meetings; and the European Council’s 
ever-widening agenda led it to deal with an ever larger set of transnational and global issues 
that went beyond the only EEC remit. In that sense, the rise of the European Council in the 
EEC institutional set-up represents a typical example of the ever greater embeddedness of 
European integration and cooperation in global dynamics.5 This article argues that the 
dynamics of the European Council cannot be properly understood without reference to the 
supranational Community dimension (including the role of the EEC Commission and the 
European Parliament in particular) and to the mutual influence with transnational actors (such 
as trade unions, business groups and consumer organisations). A large literature from political 
                                                        
4 See for instance Wolfram Kaiser, Brigitte Leucht, and Morten Rasmussen, The History of the European Union 
Origins of a Trans- and Supranational Polity 1950-72 (New York; London: Routledge, 2009) which covers the 
pre-1974 period but has a wider research agenda. For reflections about the need to overcome such artificial 
distinctions from a political science perspective, see François Foret and Yann-Sven Rittelmeyer, 'Introduction', 
in François Foret and Yann-Sven Rittelmeyer, eds., The European Council and European Governance. The 
Commanding Heights of the EU (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), 2. 
5 On the wider issue of articulating global and European dimensions see Federico Romero, ed., 'The International 
History of European Integration in the Long 1970s', Journal of European Integration History, 17, 2 (2011), 330–
360; Éric Bussière, ed., 'Régionalisme européen et mondialisation', Les cahiers Irice, 9, 1 (2012); Kiran K. Patel, 
'Provincialising European Union: Co-Operation and Integration in Europe in a Historical Perspective', 
Contemporary European History, 22, 4 (2013), 649–673. 
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science,6 law7 and European Council observers8 analyses the emergence of regular EEC/EU 
summit meetings and especially their role in today’s governance.9 These works provide many 
important insights, but all use a different methodology and most importantly a different 
questioning from this article. Early research on the European Council improved our 
understanding of the role and functions of regular EEC summit meetings, while more recent 
studies look into the contemporary evolution of the European Council in EU policymaking.                                                         
6 Foret and Rittelmeyer, The European Council and European Governance; Yann-Svenn Rittelmeyer, 
'L'institutionnalisation du Conseil européen: étude du processus de codification de l'ordre politique européen,' 
unpublished PhD Thesis, Université Libre de Bruxelles, 2012. Pioneering studies on the European Council 
include Wolfgang Wessels, Der Europäische Rat: Stabilisierung statt Integration?: Geschichte, Entwicklung 
und Zukunft der EG-Gipfelkonferenzen (Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1980); Simon Bulmer, 'The European 
Council’s First Decade: Between Interdependence and Domestic Politics', JCMS: Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 24, 2 (1985), 89–104; Simon Bulmer and Wolfgang Wessels, The European Council: Decision-Making 
in European Politics (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987); Jean-Marc Hoscheit and Wolfgang Wessels, The 
European Council 1974-1986: Evaluation and Prospects (Maastricht: European Institute of Public 
Administration, 1988). For more recent accounts see Michel Mangenot, 'Un nouveau président pour l'Union 
européenne: le traité de Lisbonne ou le triangle institutionnel à quatre côtés', Savoir Agir, 11 (2010), 111-117; 
Wolfgang Wessels, 'The Maastricht Treaty and the European Council: The History of an Institutional Evolution', 
Journal of European Integration, 34, 7 (2012), 753-767, and Wolfgang Wessels, The European Council 
(London: Palgrave, 2016).   
7 Taulègne, Le Conseil européen; Frederic Eggermont, The Changing Role of the European Council in the 
Institutional Framework of the European Union (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2012). 
8 Jan Werts, The European Council (New York: Elsevier, 1992 and London: John Harper, 2008); Christopher Bo 
Bramsen, 'Le Conseil européen: son fonctionnement et ses résultats de 1975 à 1981,' Revue du Marché Commun, 
25, 262 (1982), 624–642; Pierre de Boissieu (et al.), National Leaders and the Making of Europe: Key Episodes 
in the Life of the European Council (London: Harper, 2015). 
9 The library of the EU Council of Ministers provides a useful bibliography on the European Council: General 
Secretariat, Directorate-General F – Communication and Transparency Library, Research on the Council of the 
EU, the European Council and the General Secretariat – a bibliography, Brussels, October 2012.  
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By adopting a historical approach, this article aims, by contrast, to shed new light on the 
reasons why the European Council lasted, bringing new evidence drawn from previously 
unused European Council archives. 
 
Europe in a globalising world 
 
The rise of globalisation at the turn of the 1970s is the first element explaining why the 
European Council emerged as a key actor in the EEC’s (economic) governance.10 Faced with 
multiple international crises, EEC leaders realised that their coordination at EEC level was 
poor, and decided to meet on a regular and frequent basis in order to try coordinate their 
response to those international challenges. Among the various problems facing the EEC from 
the mid-1970s, macroeconomic issues ranked very high, including European monetary 
instability, inflation, the development of the common/single market, and international trade. 
Since these policy issues had implications beyond the traditional remit of individual 
ministries, the EEC needed a greater degree of coordination at heads-of-government level, if 
not some kind of collective leadership, in order to try and tackle these problems. Even in the 
absence of concrete results, the ability to present a united EEC front at the international level 
was something much looked after by heads of government.11 The European Council offered 
the ideal institutional setting where these issues could be discussed. The two sentences                                                         
10 This argument can be broadened to the rise of institutionalised international summitry in general, see 
Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol, ‘Managing from the Top’: Globalisation and the Rise of Regular Summitry, Mid-
1970s–early 1980s', Diplomacy & Statecraft, 23, 4 (2012), 679–703. 
11 See Federico Romero’s argument about the G7, that also applies well to the European Council: Federico 
Romero, ‘Refashioning the West to dispel its fears: the early G7 summits’, in Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol and 
Federico Romero, eds., International Summitry and Global Governance: the Rise of the European Council and 
the G7, 1974-1991 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), 117-137. 
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constituting part of the uncodified constitution of the European Council, namely, the 
December 1974 Paris summit communiqué, made plain the centrality of this globalisation 
dynamic in the holding of meetings at heads-of-government level:  
 
“Recognizing the need for an overall approach to the internal problems involved in 
achieving European unity and the external problems facing Europe, the Heads of 
Government consider it essential to ensure progress and overall consistency in the 
activities of the Communities and in the work on political co-operation. The Heads of 
Government have therefore decided to meet, accompanied by the Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs, three times a year and, whenever necessary, in the Council of the 
Communities and in the context of political co-operation.”12 
 
A detailed analysis of the deliberations and agendas of the European Council helps better 
witness the predominance of macroeconomic issues during heads of government meetings. 
Instead of looking at the European Council’s conclusions and then deducing from those the 
European Council’s agenda as is the case in recent political science studies, I looked at the 
actual discussions as reported in the various records of the meetings.13 Focusing only on the 
conclusions overlooks the fact that deliberation was at the centre of the European Council’s 
activity from the very start; and that this deliberation was not necessarily recorded in the 
conclusions. Quite regularly, the discussion about the macroeconomic situation did not 
automatically lead to clear-cut conclusions that heads of government considered worthy of 
recording. But having had the opportunity to actually discuss them represented one of the 
raison d’être of the European Council, namely, providing the opportunity for EEC leaders to 
                                                        
12 Final communiqué of the meeting of heads of government of the Community, Paris, 9 and 10 December 1974, 
in Bulletin of the European Communities. December 1974, 12, 7-12 (hereafter 1974 final communiqué). 
13 Petya Alexandrova, Marcelo Carammia, Sebastian Princen and Arco Timmermans, 'Measuring the European 
Council Agenda: Introducing a New Approach and Dataset', European Union Politics, 15, 1 (2014), 152–167; 
Petya Alexandrova, Marcello Carammia, and Arco Timmermans, 'Policy Punctuations and Issue Diversity on the 
European Council Agenda', Policy Studies Journal, 40, 1 (2012), 69–88. 
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freely exchange their views in a regular European institutional framework. I have arranged the 
topics heads of governments tackled in eleven wider themes, as shown in Table 1.  
 
Simplified heading  
(in alphabetical order) 
Individual topics 
British question renegotiation of the mid-1970s, budgetary question of the 1980s 
CAP (common agricultural policy) Fishing policy was also discussed (5 meetings) 
EEC enlargement Enlargements to Greece, Spain and Portugal 
Environment - 
European Council’s functioning 
1977 London declaration; occasional debates about the 
functioning of the European Council (EUCO) 
European Parliament matters direct election, salary of MEPs 
Future development of the EEC 
Tindemans Report, Three Wise Men’s report, Spaak Committee, 
Spierenburg Report, successive Commission’s Reports on 
European Union, etc. 
Macroeconomic situation 
economy, finance, currency relations, unemployment, inflation, 
trade, energy 
North-South relations North-South dialogue, aid for development 
Political cooperation 
Includes all topics that did not fell under the Treaties of Rome 
(eg European Political Cooperation matters, judicial 
cooperation) 
Relations with Japan Mostly relating to trade but discussed as a separate item 
 
Table 1 – European Council’s main topics of discussion, 1975-1986 
 
All 35 meetings tackled the macroeconomic situation (Figure 1); and indeed most of them 
started off with an often lengthy and detailed discussion of the macroeconomic situation, in its 
multi-faceted policy dimensions (economic and social situation, currency relations, inflation, 
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unemployment). The European Council provided a key forum to (attempt to) coordinate 
macroeconomic policies in an EEC context. The European Council was the central forum 
where heads of government exchanged their views on how the EEC’s economies could and 
should work in a European/global context. This was plain in the run-up to the EMS and in the 
early 1980s when the French government’s economic policy course was under pressure.14 
Heads of government’s deliberations did not necessarily lead to policy results, but the mere 
ability to deliberate in an EEC-wide forum about international macroeconomic issues 
represented a significant evolution in the EEC institutional set-up. Most often, all different 
aspects of macroeconomic policymaking were taken together. Energy was perhaps the only 
exception, since at the time of the oil shocks it was treated as a separate item, although always 
linked back to its overall economic implications, such as inflation. Some sessions also began 
with a report from the president on the discussion he had just had with the European Trade 
Unions Confederation (ETUC), as I will develop in the third section, and then immediately 
moved on to macroeconomic matters. The EEC’s integration in a globalising world also 
concerned other policy areas, although still heavily related to economic issues. Japan’s trade 
relations with the EEC occupied an important place in European Councils’ agendas (9), as 
well as North-South relations/aid for development (8), the British question (13) and the 
CAP/fishing policy (13/5). As second topic most discussed in European Council meetings, 
political cooperation comes up close, with 31 sessions out of the 35 meetings analysed in this 
article. This is no cause for surprise and highlights the genuinely hybrid nature of the 
European Council, covering both Community affairs and political cooperation (that is, the 
policy areas that were not covered by the EEC legal framework). The issues tackled were                                                         
14 See respectively Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol, A Europe Made of Money: the Emergence of the European 
Monetary System (Ithaca/NY: Cornell University Press, 2012), chapters 2 to 4 and Vincent Duchaussoy, La 
Banque de France et l'État: de Giscard à Mitterrand, enjeux de pouvoir ou résurgence du mur d'argent ?, 1978-
1984 (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2011).  
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extremely varied, and did not necessarily lead to clear-cut conclusions, including East-West 
relations, Middle East, Africa, terrorism and judicial cooperation, to name but a few. Only 
four meetings did not really tackle political cooperation topics. The EMS and the so-called 
concurrent studies about greater EEC resource transfers that ran in parallel, the remuneration 
of the members of the European Parliament, CAP and fishing policy exclusively dominated 
the discussions of the Brussels European Council session held in December 1978; and internal 
Community issues (chiefly the British budgetary question) largely sidestepped any political 
cooperation discussions during three consecutive summits (Athens in December 1983, 
Brussels in March 1984 and Fontainebleau in June 1984). 
 
 
Figure 1 – Topics discussed in the European Council, 1975-198615                                                         
15 Author’s calculations based on European Council’s official and unofficial records of discussions, briefings (in 
the case where no record of the discussions existed), communiqués and conclusions.  
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Having the European Council as the “predominant player in economic governance” is 
therefore hardly a new feature of the post-Maastricht period, contrary to what Uwe Puetter 
recently argued.16 Ever since the European Council’s inception, macroeconomic issues gave 
(and still give17) birth to long interpretative discussions about the causes, consequences and 
possible remedies of the multifaceted economic crises. If the Essen European Council of 1994 
focused on the employment situation, the rise of unemployment was equally central to 
European Council discussions in the 1970s and 1980s. From the mid-1970s to the early 
1980s, and in addition to the rise of unemployment, EEC prime ministers talked at length in 
European Council meetings to share their views about how to deal with international 
monetary instability, and the oil shocks, to name but a few. These discussions were often long 
simply because heads of governments did not agree on the root causes explaining the 
situation, or even more simply did not understand them. The various records of European 
Council sessions until 1986 reflect the heads of government’s striking lucidity about the 
difficulty to make sense of the crises of the 1970s-early 1980s. British prime minister Jim 
Callaghan was reported as having made this point at a European Council meeting in Brussels 
in 1976: “At this stage, Mr Callaghan would just like to note that the world today is 
experiencing the most profound socio-economic evolution of peoples since the beginning of 
the twentieth century and most governments if not all seem largely incapable of mastering                                                         
16 Uwe Puetter, 'Europe’s Deliberative Intergovernmentalism: The Role of the Council and European Council in 
EU Economic Governance', Journal of European Public Policy, 19, 2 (2012), 161–178, and Uwe Puetter, The 
European Council and the Council: New Intergovernmentalism and Institutional Change (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014). 
17 See for instance the description of European Council discussions in recent years in Cerstin Gammelin and 
Raimund Löw, Europas Strippenzieher. Wer in Brüssel wirklich regiert (Berlin: Econ Verlag, 2014) or the 
EuroComment’s Briefing Notes (www.eurocomment.eu, accessed 13 August 2014). 
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this whole phenomenon.”18 In spite of such occasional frustrations however, the European 
Council’s emergence did fill a void in the EEC’s institutional set-up, as the next session will 
show.  
 
 
A new and satisfactory institutional balance 
 
Within twelve years, European Council meetings found their place in the EEC institutional 
balance. This surely did not go without problems; but the fact that the newfound equilibrium 
in the EEC polity was satisfactory to all the actors involved in EEC policymaking allowed for 
the European Council to become a central actor in Europe’s governance. The European 
Council’s stabilisation in the EEC institutional landscape is best observed in two respects, one 
related to the European Council’s functions, the other to the EEC’s overall constitutional 
order. 
 
The functions of the European Council were not described in the 1986 Single European Act, 
which merely mentioned the European Council’s existence.19 Only the 1992 Maastricht treaty 
added a little more details.20 The absence of any codified constitution represented a very                                                         
18 CMA, HICA.H.CM2 CEE, CEEA.1976.2.4, Procès-verbal de la session du Conseil européen tenue à 
Bruxelles les 12 et 13 juillet 1976, 21 September 1976. My translation. 
19 Article 2 reads: “The European Council shall bring together the Heads of State or of Government of the 
Member States and the President of the Commission of the European Communities. They shall be assisted by the 
Ministers for Foreign Affairs and by a Member of the Commission. The European Council shall meet at least 
twice a year.” 
20 Title I, Article D, reads: “The European Council shall provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its 
development and shall define the general political guidelines thereof.” Article 103 mentions that the European 
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British way of having an unwritten constitution that was largely foreign, until then, to the 
EEC legal tradition.21 The British Foreign Office most aptly summarised this state of affairs 
in a brief to British prime minister Margaret Thatcher in preparing the very first European 
Council meeting she attended, in Strasbourg in June 1979: “The European Council is not an 
institution set up by the Treaties and its formal status is nowhere very clearly defined – partly 
in order to preserve its informality of procedures.”22 This also partly explains why 
interpretation about the European Council’s institutional nature came to be one of the very 
first contentious issues.23 Regular heads of government’s meetings could be interpreted as a 
part of a confederal scheme, since their existence prioritised intergovernmental cooperation. 
But such regular meetings also institutionalised the participation of heads of government in a 
process of supranational cooperation (the European Commission participated from the outset 
in 1974): this was the version considering the European Council as an excrescence or a 
variant of the Council of Ministers.24 These ambiguities prevented the European Council from                                                                                                                                                                              
Council could discuss economic conditions: “The European Council shall, acting on the basis of the report from 
the Council, discuss a conclusion on the broad guidelines of the economic policies of the Member States and of 
the Community.” Finally article J8 states that “The European Council shall define the principles of and general 
guidelines for the common foreign and security policy. (...) It shall ensure the unity, consistency and 
effectiveness of action by the Union.” 
21 Except perhaps for some of the institutional changes that occurred in the 1960s, see N. Piers Ludlow, The 
European Community and the Crises of the 1960s: Negotiating the Gaullist Challenge (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2006). Interestingly the European Council was called an “institution”, in spite of not being one formally yet. 
22 The National Archives, UK (hereafter TNA), FCO brief on European Council, Strasbourg, 21/22 June 1979, 7 
June 1979. 
23 CMA, HICA.H.CM2 CEE, CEEA.1975.126.4, Note of Hommel, Conseil européen de Rome, 1er/2 décembre 
1975, 31 March 1976. 
24 For more details about the different legal interpretations about the European Council’s place in the EEC’s 
constitutional order, see Taulègne, Le Conseil européen, 92–100. 
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being viewed as exclusively one of these two options, and opened the way for a third one: that 
of a sui generis institution.25 The European Council came to be seen as a new institution, 
functioning in the Community framework, but distinct from the Council of Ministers. In that 
sense, the European Council could be both intergovernmental and communautaire. The 
practice progressively blurred the intergovernmental/communautaire distinction, as will be 
shown below. The European Council allowed EEC heads of government to discuss topics of 
common interest, overriding administrative (and increasingly artificial) distinctions between 
EEC and non-EEC matters.  
 
The institutional practice that developed over time witnessed the clear emergence of the 
European Council’s two main functions – orientation and arbitration – already after only a 
few years of operation.26 Heads of government developed a custom that their successors 
mostly kept intact. The ability of the European Council to orient the future EEC endeavours 
had, for instance, clearly appeared well before it was enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty’s 
Title I, Article D. In the course of the 1970s and 1980s, the European Council often talked 
about the future of European integration (in 24 meetings, see Figure 1), and commissioned 
reports about it as well, like the Tindemans report and the Three Wise Men’s report, to name 
but two obvious examples.27 The capacity of the European Council to concentrate discussions                                                         
25 Taulègne, Le Conseil européen, second part; and Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol, 'Regional Integration and Global 
Governance: The Example of the European Council, 1974-1986', Les Cahiers Irice, 1, 9 (2012), 91–104. 
26 Taulègne, Le Conseil européen; Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol, 'The Victory of the Intergovernmental Method? 
The Emergence of the European Council in the EEC’s Institutional Set-Up, 1974-1977', in Daniela Preda and 
Daniele Pasquinucci, eds., The Road Europe Travelled Along: The Evolution of  the EEC/EU Institutions and 
Policies (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2010), 27–40. 
27 The European Council commissioned these reports respectively at the Paris summit (December 1974) and the 
Brussels meeting (December 1978). 
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on the future of European integration allowed summit meetings to partly appropriate 
themselves the prospective dimension of integration.  
 
A second important function was that of arbitration. The European Council was, whenever 
possible, acting as an EEC referee, that is, choosing between the different options available on 
the negotiations’ table. Summit meetings offered an opportunity to try to agree on issues that 
had not been settled elsewhere. In the press conference that took place after the European 
Council meeting in Brussels in December 1977, president of the Commission Roy Jenkins 
lauded the European Council’s “ability to cut through disagreements where necessary and to 
give a renewed momentum to the process of integration.”28 The EMS negotiations provide a 
good example of this, and an early one in the history of the European Council. In the 
specialised committees (Monetary Committee and Committee of Governors), the EEC 
member states’ delegations found themselves unable to agree on the role to be given to the so-
called divergence indicator that the EMS was supposed to include. The divergence indicator 
was a technical device that would be used to pinpoint at the currency that was diverging from 
the EEC currencies’ average. But what action would the identification of the divergent 
currency trigger? Two options were envisaged during the negotiations: automatic 
interventions by the centrals banks to support a currency, or mere consultations among them. 
The EEC heads of government, during the European Council meeting of December 1978 in 
Brussels, decided to reject the option of automatic interventions, thereby removing an 
obstacle to the eventual inception of the EMS.29 
 
                                                        
28 CMA, HICA.H.CM2 CEE, CEEA.1977.3.3, European Council, 6 December 1977, press conference. 
29 Mourlon-Druol, A Europe Made of Money, 250–257. 
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The clarification of the European Council’s functions removed the degree of uncertainty that 
may have remained about the purpose and usefulness of such meetings. Regular heads of 
governments meetings established a new administrative and diplomatic practice; all actors 
involved in EEC policymaking processes knew what was the European Council’s potential as 
an institutional tool, even societal actors, as the next section will show. Such a clarification of 
the European Council’s functions constitutes the first aspect that contributed to stabilise the 
European Council in the EEC polity.  
 
The ability to map the European Council in the EEC constitutional landscape represented the 
second element that contributed to stabilise, and render central, the European Council. The 
three-pillar structure created by the Maastricht treaty was certainly the most striking 
constitutional evolution of the early 1990s. The newly created EU was composed of three 
elements: the European Communities (EC), the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). The first pillar represented the “Community method” 
while the second and third pillars were “intergovernmental” in nature. The European Council 
was, in such an institutional set-up, the “federating power of the three pillars” as it was 
described in a background note to French president François Mitterrand at the time of the 
Maastricht Treaty negotiations.30 
 
                                                        
30 Archives nationales, site de Pierrefitte (hereafter AN), 5AG4/PHB8 dossier 4, Fiche du Conseiller technique, 
présidence de la République, la structure du traité, 6 December 1991. 
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Figure 2 – The European Council’s place in the Maastricht Treaty’s three pillars structure 
 
Yet this structure was in fact a mere formalisation of the set-up that had been in place since 
the mid-1970s.31 As mentioned above, the European Council did possess a constitution, but it 
was an uncodified one: it was composed of the Paris summit communiqué of December 1974 
and the London declaration of June 1977.32 In setting out the reasons explaining the creation 
of the European Council, the 1974 final communiqué mentioned above explicitly mentioned 
that heads of government would “ensure progress and overall consistency in the activities of 
the Communities and in the work on political co-operation.” The communiqué put an end to 
the long-standing French opposition to having simultaneous meetings of foreign ministers in 
the EEC and EPC contexts: “In order to ensure consistency in Community activities and 
continuity of work, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, meeting in the Council of the 
Community, will act as initiators and co-ordinators. They may hold political cooperation                                                         
31 On this point see Helen Wallace, 'The Institutions of the EU: Experience and Experiments', in Helen Wallace 
and William Wallace, Policy-Making in the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 56. 
32 To these two texts could also be added the 1981 London report on EPC, which confirmed the role of the 
European Council in EPC, and the 1983 Stuttgart Solemn Declaration, which formalised the regular visit of the 
European Council’s president at the European Parliament once a year. 
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meetings at the same time.” Finally, it is worth noting that the 1974 communiqué duly stated 
that it respected the “constitutional bloc” of both the EEC and EPC: “These arrangements do 
not in any way affect the rules and procedures laid down in the Treaties or the provisions on 
political co-operation in the Luxembourg and Copenhagen Reports. At the various meetings 
referred to in the preceding paragraphs the Commission will exercise the powers vested in it 
and play the part assigned to it by the above texts.” 
 
The 1977 London declaration foreshadowed, mutatis mutandis, the “rules of procedure” 
adopted by the European Council in December 2009 shortly after the Lisbon Treaty.33 The 
latter are of course more detailed, but the goal of the 1977 London declaration was similar: to 
clarify in writing the internal functioning of the European Council. After about two years of 
activity, EEC heads of government felt the need to set out in some detail the way in which the 
European Council should function. Giscard, in leaving the European Council meeting in The 
Hague in November 1976, declared that he was unhappy with the way in which the European 
Council worked, and announced that he would soon send propositions on how to improve it.34 
This initiated a correspondence between heads of government about how European Council 
meetings should function. Overall, this exchange of letters highlighted that all heads of 
government had found in the European Council a useful instrument.35 The outcome of this 
correspondence, the 1977 London declaration, focused on the organisation of the meetings in                                                         
33 Official Journal of the European Union, European Council Decision of 1 December 2009 adopting its rules 
and procedures, 2009/882/EU. It is also interesting to note that the very expression of “president of the European 
Council” had currency already in 1975, long before the creation of the permanent position set out in the 2009 
Lisbon Treaty. 
34 CMA, HICA.H.CM2 CEE, CEEA.1976.3.4, Procès-verbal de la session du Conseil européen tenue à la Haye 
les 29 et 30 novembre 1976, 14 January 1977. 
35 This exchange of letters is available in CMA, HICA.H.CM2 CEE, CEEA.1977.1.2. 
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five areas: the type of discussions, the preparation of the agenda, the issuing of statements, the 
recording of conclusions, and the attendance of officials.36 One of the most important features 
of the declaration was to distinguish between “informal discussions,” that did not necessarily 
lead to decisions, and “formal decisions.” This very distinction highlights the growing 
importance that the European Council took in EEC policymaking. It moved beyond the “fire-
side chat” that Giscard and Schmidt wanted to make regular in 1974, and further progressed 
towards becoming a full-fledged institution. 
 
A close examination of the EEC structure as modified after the European Council’s creation 
in 1974 highlights that the Maastricht Treaty’s three-pillar structure was a mere codification 
of the three-fold structure which had been emerging over the years. The three pillars were 
already sketched in the mid-1970s: most obviously, the “Community affairs” described in the 
1974 communiqué became “the Communities” in the Maastricht treaty; EPC became 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); and the Trevi meetings were forerunners of the 
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) pillar.37 The overall picture, if slightly different from that of 
the Maastricht treaty, bears however a striking resemblance with it, in particular with respect 
to the European Council’s place at the apex of the construction. Based on the description of 
the 1974 Paris communiqué, the EEC institutional set-up from 1974 until 1992 is presented in 
Figure 3. 
                                                         
36 London declaration on the organisation of European Council meetings, 30 June 1977, in Bulletin of the 
European Communities, June 1977, 6, 83. 
37 On the relationship between the European Council and EPC/political cooperation, see Emmanuel Mourlon-
Druol, 'More than a Prestigious Spokesperson: The Role of Summits/the European Council in European Political 
Cooperation, 1969-1981', in Foret and Rittelmeyer, eds., The European Council and European Governance, 43–
52. 
 22 
 
 
Figure 3 – The European Council’s institutional place in the EEC, 1974-1991 
 
The European Council allowed pulling together various policy areas at the top, especially in 
cases where some form of European cooperation was needed, but could not necessarily take 
place in the existing legal apparatus of the EEC.38 This institutional flexibility allowed for the 
development of a number of new policies that belonged to political cooperation but not to 
EPC, and that would subsequently be put under the umbrella of the Maastricht Treaty’s JHA 
pillar. The 1970 Luxembourg report had indeed circumscribed “political unification” to EPC, 
                                                        
38 The issue of overlapping of international fora was for instance well reflected in a internal note of the French 
Foreign ministry, see Archives du ministère des affaires étrangères français (hereafter AMAE), Direction des 
affaires économiques et financières (hereafter DAEF), 2499, Direction des affaires juridiques, Instances dans 
lesquelles sont abordées les questions relatives au terrorisme, à la drogue et aux contrôles des frontières, 3 
December 1986. 
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although some topics did not relate exclusively to foreign affairs.39 Such topics belonged to 
what Simon Nuttall dubbed the “Grey Area” and concerned two important dimensions, 
judicial cooperation and terrorism.40 The European Council played a significant role in the 
development of both areas.41 The 1981 London Report on EPC confirmed this institutional 
set-up placing the European Council at the apex of the EPC hierarchy.42 
 
This newfound institutional balance can also be witnessed in the European Council’s 
relationship with the other EEC (full-fledged) institutions. In fact, Gueben’s criticism against 
the European Council, referred to at the beginning of this article, related precisely to EEC 
inter-institutional relations: 
 
“the regularity of the sessions (three per year) leads necessarily the European Council 
to deal with questions that fall under the competence of “classic” institutions. These 
institutions, therefore, experience a natural tendency to “wash their hands of it,” 
voluntarily or not, as in the end the final decision escapes them. (…) Concerning final 
decisions, it seems that, more and more, those are taken outside the institutional or 
para-institutional system of the Community. This is a formula of the type directoire 
aménagé that is applied, in the sense that the consensus is looked for, and often 
established, by bilateral relations between the three big of the Community.”43 
 
Gueben’s note reflected regular concerns about the European Council’s place in the EEC 
institutional set-up. But if these inter-institutional relations were mostly uncodified, they have                                                         
39 Davide Zampoli, 'I primi passi della cooperazione politica europea: problematiche ed evoluzione istituzionale', 
in Antonio Varsori, ed., Alle origini del presente. L’Europa occidentale nella crisi degli anni settanta (Milan: 
FrancoAngeli, 2007), 169-192. 
40 Simon Nuttall, European Political Cooperation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992). 
41 For more details see Mourlon-Druol, 'More than a Prestigious Spokesperson'.  
42 AMAE, DAEF 4972, Conseil européen de Londres, 26-27 novembre 1981, résultats politiques. 
43 CMA, HICA.H.CM2 CEE, CEEA.1976.2.2, Gueben to Hommel, Conseil européen des 12-13 juillet 1976, 6 
July 1976. 
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however been progressively clarified in practice. The first institution that may have called in 
doubt the European Council’s existence was the European Commission. It must be recalled 
that the Commission has ever been present, and very actively involved, at European Council 
meetings from the very start, unlike in the G7.44 In terms of diplomatic protocol, the president 
of the Commission was treated like a head of government.45 The Commission’s successive 
presidents – François-Xavier Ortoli, Roy Jenkins, Gaston Thorn, Jacques Delors – all 
supported the institution.46 Reporting to the European Parliament on the results of the first 
European Council held in Dublin in March 1975, Ortoli described the meeting as having 
confirmed that regular heads of government’s meetings were very useful. He further asserted 
that the role of the Commission had been duly respected.47 Jenkins’ appreciation of the 
European Council is more famous. It is still worth noting that he welcomed in 1977 the fact 
that “the European Council agrees with the Commission that the broader issues [about EMU] 
are to be carried into the other Community institutions, Parliament, Economic and Social 
Committee, Tripartite Conference” – in short, that the European Council respected each EEC 
                                                        
44 Giuliano Garavini, 'The Battle for the Participation of the European Community in the G7 (1975-1977)', 
Journal of European Integration History, 12, 1 (2006), 141–158. 
45 AMAE, Direction Europe (hereafter DE), 4973, Direction d’Europe, Note de compte-rendu n°960/EU, 
Colloque sur le Conseil européen, Erenstein, 26-27 octobre 1984, 30 October 1984. 
46 N. Piers Ludlow, 'Relations with the European Council', in Éric Bussière et al., eds., The European 
Commission 1973-1986: History and Memories of an Institution (Luxembourg: Publications Office, 2014), 207–
212. 
47 CMA, HICA.H.CM2 CEE, CEEA.1975.124.5, Note d’information sur les travaux de l’Assemblée, 
Communications du Président du Conseil et du Président de la Commission sur les résultats du Conseil européen 
qui s’est réuni à Dublin les 10 et 11 mars 1975, 18 March 1975. 
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institution’s place and role.48 Gaston Thorn, Luxembourg prime minister (1974-1979) when 
the European Council was created, and already supportive of the institution at the time, was 
unlikely to suddenly turn into an opponent once appointed president of the European 
Commission (1981-1985), especially as he succeeded two other presidents who had been 
sympathetic with the idea of regular heads of government’s meetings. Finally Jacques Delors, 
president of the European Commission from 1985 to 1995, was perhaps the most famous at 
skillfully using such routine heads of government’s meetings.49 
 
Relations with the European Parliament, if overall limited, also existed from the very 
beginning. Garrett Fitzgerald, Irish foreign minister, and Ortoli, began reporting on the results 
of the summit to the European Parliament as early as after the very first European Council 
meeting held in Dublin in March 1975.50 The practice of having the presidency’s foreign 
minister and the president of the Commission informing the European Parliament after each 
European Council session was subsequently maintained. The Irish foreign minister attended 
the inaugural session of the directly-elected European Parliament in 1979.51 In June 1984, the 
French foreign ministry even considered inviting the president of the European Parliament to 
one of the meals of the European Council for an informal discussion with heads of 
                                                        
48 CMA, HICA.H.CM2 CEE, CEEA.1977.3.3, European Council, 6 December 1977, press conference. On 
Jenkins’ very conscious use of the European Council in the EMS negotiations, see Mourlon-Druol, A Europe 
Made of Money, 160-162. 
49 See Ken Endo, The Presidency of the European Commission under Jacques Delors: The Politics of Shared 
Leadership (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999); Werts, The European Council, 2008, 49. 
50 CMA, HICA.H.CM2 CEE, CEEA.1975.124.5, Note d’information sur les travaux de l’Assemblée, 
Communications du Président du Conseil et du Président de la Commission, 18 March 1975. 
51 Report on European Institutions presented by the Committee of Three to the European Council, October 1979, 
20. 
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governments – although it does not seem that this suggestion has been taken any further.52 It 
was only on 16 December 1981 that for the first time a head of government herself, Margaret 
Thatcher, reported to the European Parliament on the last European Council session held in 
London in November.53 The tradition was maintained and formalised after the 1983 Stuttgart 
Solemn Declaration which set out that “The European Council will address a report to the 
European Parliament after each of its meetings. This report will presented at least once during 
each Presidency by the President of the European Council” – that is, a head of government, 
instead of the foreign minister. German chancellor Helmut Kohl did so after the Stuttgart 
meeting itself on 30 June 1983, and insisted on “the need for a dialogue between the 
European Parliament and the President of the European Council.”54 
 
Multiple reports acknowledged the importance of the European Council in the EEC 
institutional set-up. The so-called Three Wise Men’s report released in 1979 even read that 
“The European Council has existed under the name for less than five years. It is now agreed 
that it has become indispensable in the overall operation of the Community.”55 Both the 
November 1981 German-Italian initiative for a Draft European Act and the subsequent 1983 
Solemn Declaration on European Union confirmed the centrality of the European Council. 
                                                        
52 AMAE, DE 4974, Direction d’Europe, Invitation du Président du Parlement européen au Conseil européen, 22 
June 1984. 
53 CMA, HICA.H.CM2 CEE, CEEA.1981.3.4, respectively speech by secretary of state for foreign and 
commonwealth office, 3 July 1981 and déclaration du Conseil européen à la suite de la réunion de Londres, 16 
December 1981. 
54 Official Journal of the European Communities (OJEC). Debates of the European Parliament. 30.06.1983, n° 1- 
301. “Report by Helmut Kohl to the European Parliament (30 June 1983)”, p. 16-21. 
55 Report on European Institutions presented by the Committee of Three to the European Council, October 1979, 
15. 
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The two documents placed the European Council at the centre of the EEC polity in terms of 
its orientation and decision-making abilities. Perhaps more importantly the European Council 
was clearly presented as the key institution likely to give coherence to the development of 
EEC matters and political cooperation – in order to avoid seeing them evolve into two 
separate and isolated areas.56 
 
All this is certainly not to suggest that inter-institutional relations in the EEC were undergoing 
some sort of honeymoon throughout the 1975-1986 period. Rather it is to highlight that in 
spite of inevitable ups and downs, the fact that the European Council’s relations with other 
EEC institutions did not go through major tensions and crises contributed to its emergence in 
the EEC institutional landscape as a stable, and indispensable, institution. The European 
Council’s public impact in terms of media coverage and connections with civil society only 
further reinforced this trend. 
 
 
Societal actors and an ever-increasing public impact 
 
The third factor that needs to be taken into account in explaining why the European Council 
emerged as a central and stable actor in the EEC polity is its public impact. First of all, the                                                         
56 Point 1 of the Draft Act reads: “The decision-making structures of the European Communities and European 
political cooperation shall be brought under the responsibility of the European Council. The European Council 
shall be the source of political guidance of the European Community and of European political cooperation.” In 
German-Italian initiative, Draft European Act, Bulletin of the European Communities, No. 11/1981; Margaret 
Thatcher Archives (hereafter MTA), document 114112, Stuttgart European Council: Presidency Conclusions, 19 
June 1983. See also CMA, HICA.H.CM2 CEE, CEEA.1985, Ad hoc committee for institutional affairs, Report 
to the European Council, 29-30 March 1985. 
 28 
EEC leaders’ political legitimacy – or even lack thereof – gave much impact in the public to 
their meetings. Praised or criticised, the gathering of EEC heads of government needed to be 
covered by the press, for it appeared to be the clearest moment in the complex EEC 
machinery when a decision could actually be reached. To be sure, many agreements reached 
on the occasion of European Councils were, and still are, to a large extent, the fruit of 
negotiations carried out elsewhere. Even in the cases where the European Council achieved its 
most famous breakthroughs – British budgetary question, monetary cooperation – other fora 
have been central in paving the way to the final agreement (Council of Ministers, Committee 
of Governors, Monetary Committee, COREPER, etc.). But what the public and the press 
could perceive was certainly a different narrative. Gossip about heads of government’s 
discussions represented the perfect ingredient to an easy journalistic story-telling, unlike 
technical issues discussed in an abstruse fashion during obscure Committee meetings. 
 
Second, and reinforcing the first trend, the leaders themselves perceived the public impact of 
their meetings as an important reason to hold them in the first place; the European Council’s 
public impact quickly became a critical factor that heads of governments wanted to take into 
account during their meetings. In opening the first European Council meeting in Dublin in 
March 1975, Irish prime minister Liam Cosgrave announced that “there should be no formal 
communiqué issued after the meeting. At the same time participants will be aware that there is 
a certain anxiety on the part of some that formal declarations be made on certain issues arising 
at the meeting.”57 Aware of the importance for public opinion of the choice of topics for 
debate between heads of government, Giscard was thus reported to have said in a European 
Council meeting in Luxembourg in April 1976 “that it would amaze public opinion if heads 
                                                        
57 CMA, HICA.H.CM2 CEE, CEEA.1975.124.3, Meeting of heads of government, Dublin, 10-11 March 1975, 
Taoiseach’s opening remarks, speaking notes. 
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of Government were not to exchange views about the economic situation.”58 European 
Council meetings, in a way that is familiar to us today and very similar to the G7 meetings, 
became key opportunities for leaders to project their presence on the international scene often 
for domestic political purposes. The discussions among heads of governments that led to the 
1977 declaration stressed this. In mentioning the need for the European Council to be able to 
discuss confidentially and informally some issues of importance, Italian prime minister Giulio 
Andreotti insisted that this very function of the European Council would need to be explained 
to public opinion so as to avoid disillusions.59 Giscard insisted that the European Council 
should help to make Europe’s voice heard in the Nine’s public opinions.60 Gaston Thorn, then 
Luxembourg prime minister, explained that a prise de position of the European Council was 
necessary if “there was an expectation from the public”61; and about six years later, in 
opening the Brussels meeting in March 1983, Thorn declared that “we should send a clear 
message to the public that our meeting today is dominated by our determination to 
concentrate all our efforts to securing a steady recovery of the economy and a reversal of the 
trend in unemployment. This overall view should be behind our conclusions [final 
communiqué] concerning the economic and social situation.”62 The difficulty to balance 
public expectations and summit meetings’ achievements represented an important challenge 
to heads of governments. In 1977 Danish prime minister Anker Jorgensen wished “a more 
balanced and more realistic attitude in public opinion as to the mission of the [European] 
Council.”63 An opinion mirrored by Jenkins, still in 1977, when he declared before the                                                         
58 TNA, PREM 16/853, Record of a meeting of the European Council, Luxembourg, 1 and 2 April 1976. 
59 CMA, HICA.H.CM2 CEE, CEEA.1977.1.2, Andreotti to Giscard, 6 February 1977. 
60 CMA, HICA.H.CM2 CEE, CEEA.1977.1.2, tableau synoptique, 1977. 
61 Ibid. 
62 CMA, HICA.H.CM2 CEE, CEEA.1983.1.2, Opening of the meeting, 21 March 1983. 
63 CMA, HICA.H.CM2 CEE, CEEA.1977.1.2, Jorgensen to Giscard, 24 February 1977. 
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European Parliament that “Either too much or too little is generally expected of European 
Councils. There is rarely a balanced public expectation of the results that might be 
achieved.”64 It is also noticeable that in the whole strategy Jenkins used to relaunch the public 
debate about European monetary integration in late 1977, the Commission’s president very 
consciously used the European Council as a trigger to launch a wider public debate in Europe 
on this issue.65  
 
Third, the press coverage of European Council meetings was more important than for any 
other EEC institution, and indeed increased over time. Investigating transnational 
communication in European integration, Jan-Henrik Meyer explains that “if there was 
European public communication in the media in the 1970s and 1980s at all, it was most likely 
to be found around the European summits” instead of in any other EEC meeting such as those 
of the Commission, Council or specialised committees. European Council meetings had 
indeed become central media events in Europe.66 The recording of journalists’ accreditations 
in the European Council’s archives is unfortunately inconsistent over time. The data available 
however provides a number of insights (Figure 5). It shows first a clear increase in the 
                                                        
64 CMA, HICA.H.CM2 CEE, CEEA.1977.2.5, Declaration of M. Jenkins at the European Parliament, 6 July 
1977. 
65 Historical Archives of the European Union (hereafter HAEU), Fonds Émile Noël (hereafter EN), 1143, Record 
of conversation between the president of the European Commission and the French prime minister, 19 
November 1977. 
66 Jan-Henrik Meyer, The European Public Sphere: Media and Transnational Communication in European 
Integration 1969-1991 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2010), 105. Meyer’s study focuses on a selection of important 
European Council meetings (Paris 1974, Brussels 1978, Luxembourg 1985, Maastricht 1991, and The Hague 
summit of 1969). 
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numbers in the journalists accredited, from 300 at the Brussels meeting in March 197567 to 
1000 in Fontainebleau in June 1984. In comparison, a regular Council of Ministers meeting 
attracted between 100 and 150 journalists in the mid-1970s.68 When a European Council 
meeting was expected to reach a significant decision, or constituted a landmark, it predictably 
attracted more journalists than those European Council meetings that had a more ordinary 
agenda. The meetings in Brussels in December 1978 (EMS), in Stuttgart in June 1983 
(Solemn Declaration), in Athens in December 1983 (first European Council meeting in 
Greece) and in Fontainebleau in June 1984 (British budgetary question) thus attracted more 
journalists than the average (respectively 509, 850 and 1000 for Athens and Fontainebleau); 
while in comparison Strasbourg in June 1979, Luxembourg in April 1980, Maastricht in 
March 1981 and Brussels in March 1982 did not seem to have captivated the media with 
respectively 190, 196, 250 and 91 accreditations. Domestic interests also heavily influenced 
the number of journalists accredited: Greek journalists represented almost a third (73) of the 
250 press accreditations for the Maastricht meeting in March 1981, as it was the first 
European Council meeting that the Greek government attended as a new EEC member state.69 
 
                                                        
67 CMA, HICA.H.CM2 CEE, CEEA.1975.125.1, Schwaiger to Seingry, 23 June 1975. 
68 CMA, HICA.H.CM2 CEE, CEEA.1975.125.1, Questions relatives à la presse à tenir en considération lors de 
la préparation de la réunion des Chefs de Gouvernement à Bruxelles, 22 May 1975 
69 CMA, HICA.H.CM2 CEE, CEEA.1981.1.1, Accréditation de presse, Conseil européen de Maastricht, mars 
1981. 
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Figure 4 – Number of journalists accredited at some European Council meetings, 1975-198470 
 
Fourth, transnational civil society directed its attention and lobbying efforts more and more 
towards the European Council, and thereby contributed to reinforce heads of governments’ 
meetings’ public impact. Trade unions, business groups, consumer associations and even 
European federalists turned their attention to the European Council as a new major actor in 
the EEC machinery that they could not afford to overlook. It suffices to consult the European 
Commission’s online audiovisual library to witness the many demonstrations that were aimed 
at head of governments’ meetings ever since the European Council’s inception.71 
 
The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) seems to have been the fastest non-
governmental actor to grasp the importance of European Council meetings. From 1975                                                         
70 Based on the various calculations provided by the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers. The five 
figures marked with an asterisk are the author’s calculations based on the full list of the journalists’ names 
provided by the Council (Brussels December 1978, Strasbourg June 1979, Luxembourg April 1980, Maastricht 
Mach 1981 and Brussels March 1982), while the remaining figures are those already calculated by the Council 
itself. 
71 See http://ec.europa.eu/avservices/index.cfm?sitelang=en, accessed 30 July 2014. 
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onwards, the ETUC president managed to organise a meeting with the then president of the 
European Council – that is, the head of government of the member state then presiding the 
EEC – right before the holding of a European Council meeting. The meeting usually took 
place in the morning preceding the first afternoon session. It was quite often the first element 
reported by the president of the European Council in opening the European Council session. 
The first meeting between the president of the European Council and the ETUC on the 
occasion of a European Council meeting took place in July 1975 in Brussels. On 6 July, Theo 
Rasschaert, secretary general of the ETUC, wrote to Aldo Moro in his quality of president of 
the European Council to ask “the European Council to receive a delegation of the European 
Confederation of Trade Unions on the occasion of its meeting on 16 and 17 July 1975, (…) in 
order to outline the common apprehensions and demands formulated in the name of the 37 
million of workers that the ETUC represents in Europe.”72 In considering its reply, the 
European Council administration contacted the permanent representatives and wondered who 
would exactly receive the delegation – the European Council as a whole, or only its 
president.73 The ETUC request was finally accepted on 15 July, when it was agreed that the 
presidents of the European Council and the European Commission would receive a delegation 
of ETUC representatives on 17 July at 9 am.74 This became a custom, as the ETUC itself 
                                                        
72 CMA, HICA.H.CM2 CEE, CEEA.1975.125.6, Rasschaert to Moro, 6 July 1975. My translation. 
73 CMA, HICA.H.CM2 CEE, CEEA.1975.125.6, Fricchione to Hommels, Demande d’audition d’une délégation 
de la Confédération européenne des syndicats au Conseil européen, 10 July 1975. 
74 CMA, HICA.H.CM2 CEE, CEEA.1975.125.6, Fricchione to Hommels, Rencontre entre les représentants de la 
Confédération européenne des syndicats et M. le président Moro, 15 July 1975. 
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noted in July 1976.75 The president of the European Council used to report about his meeting 
in opening the session, as did for instance Callaghan in March 1977 in Rome.76 
 
Business organisations and economic associations were no less reactive. The Union of 
Industrial and Employers’ Confederations (known by its acronym UNICE after the French 
name Union des industries de la Communauté européenne, now BusinessEurope), the leading 
business lobby group, also regularly sent opinion papers to the European Council ahead of its 
meetings. This started as early as in 11 July 1975, when UNICE sent a brief on raw materials; 
it later took position on the Tindemans Report, for instance.77 The European League for 
Economic Cooperation (ELEC) also turned its attention to summit meetings. In November 
1976 for instance, it issued a “Resolution in view of the European Council of 29 and 30 
November 1976” that set out its policy positions; in November 1981 about the “European 
revival”; or again in November 1983 focusing on the Community’s own resources.78 
 
Consumers associations also targeted the European Council. In November 1978, Anna 
Fransen, president of the Bureau Européen des Unions de Consommateurs (BEUC), 
consortium of consumer organisations of the EEC member states, wrote to German                                                         
75 CMA, HICA.H.CM2 CEE, CEEA.1976.2.5, Press communiqué of the ETUC, 13 July 1976. 
76 CMA, HICA.H.CM2 CEE, CEEA.1977.1.4, Procès-verbal de la session du Conseil européen tenue à Rome les 
25 et 26 mars 1977, 12 April 1977 
77 See respectively CMA, HICA.H.CM2 CEE, CEEA.1975.125.6, Huvelin to Moro, Avis sur les matières 
premières, 11 July 1975 and CMA, HICA.H.CM2 CEE, CEEA.1976.1.6, UNICE, Press release, European 
Council 1-2 April 1976: Report of Mr. Tindemans on European Union, 26 March 1976. 
78 See respectively CMA, HICA.H.CM2 CEE, CEEA.1976.3.5, LECE, Résolution en vue du Conseil européen 
des 29 et 30 novembre 1976; CMA, HICA.H.CM2 CEE, CEEA.1981.3.4, UNICE Resolution in connection with 
the European Council, 26-27 November 1981; CMA, HICA.H.CM2 CEE, CEEA.1983.3.5, Recommendation of 
the European League for Economic Cooperation to the European Council in Athens, 15 November 1983. 
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Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in his capacity of “President of the European Council.”79 She 
wrote that the BEUC “call[ed] on the Heads of Government to promote a Council meeting at 
ministerial level charged with discussing the guidelines for the Community’s future consumer 
policy, and the promotion of directives which really benefit consumers.” The rest of the letter 
detailed some measures in specific policy areas, agriculture and import 
controls/protectionism. But the most interesting aspect of this writing was the 
acknowledgement by the BEUC of the European Council’s capacity to steer policy change in 
the EEC. 
 
Even the Union of European Federalists (UEF) – which could hardly be counted among the 
first supporters of the intergovernmental method – took the European Council very seriously. 
In 1976 the UEF organised a demonstration at the entrance of the Centre Européen Kirchberg 
in Luxembourg where the European Council meeting took place on 1 April 1976.80 The UEF 
wanted to show its support of the decision to elect by direct universal suffrage the members of 
the European Parliament. In 1977 the UEF decided to organise a petition criticising EEC 
governments’ inaction, and calling them for renewed efforts towards European integration, 
especially in the EMU field. The UEF explicitly addressed the text to the European Council 
and sent it to Leo Tindemans, in his capacity of “President of the European Council.”81  
 
Evaluating the results of such contacts would require delving into much more narrowly-
confined case studies that go beyond the scope of this article. The point stands, however, that                                                         
79 CMA, HICA.H.CM2 CEE, CEEA.1978.3.7, Fransen to Schmidt, 29 November 1978. 
80 CMA, HICA.H.CM2 CEE, CEEA.1976.1.6, Letter of Angel and Wagner, Manifestation européenne publique 
à Luxembourg le 1er avril 1976, 9 March 1976. 
81 CMA, HICA.H.CM2 CEE, CEEA.1977.3.6, Chizzola (Secretary General of the UEF) to Tindemans, Pétition 
au Conseil européen, 5 December 1977.  
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if these organisations increasingly turned their attention towards the European Council in 
such a systematic fashion, this means that they considered regular EEC summits as meetings 
of prime importance. In return, this further highlights the centrality that the European Council 
acquired in the EEC institutional machinery. European Council members themselves attached 
much importance to these connections with societal actors. In the press conference at the end 
of the December 1977 European Council held in Brussels, Tindemans thus reported that he 
had met the ETUC and the UNICE before the beginning of the European Council, and 
stressed the importance of such contacts with representatives of social organisations.82 The 
public impact was therefore a self-nurturing process: European Council meetings attracted 
media attention because of the presence of heads of governments, this attracted in turn more 
public scrutiny, interest groups’ attention, which necessarily attracted even more media 
attention, and so on. This inevitably gave birth to creative endeavours, like that of the 
organisation Sail for Europe. This association “of Europeans who wish to promote the 
Community-idea through sailing” wrote to the European Council in March 1977. The 
association was seeking encouragement from heads of government for its next project, 
namely, the organisation of a “ ‘European’ entry in the next ‘around the world’ sailing 
race.”83 The name of the boat was Treaty of Rome, and it was meant to symbolise “a 
European Community which is on the move.” Set aside an indisputable talent for picking up 
the perfectly uncontrollable metaphor, this episode further highlighted the importance the 
European Council had taken in the wider public’s imagery as the EEC institution most 
capable of representing European integration. But the European Council not only contributed 
to represent the process of European integration, it also gave substantial input in the 
democratic legitimacy debate in European integration, as the next section will show. 
                                                        
82 CMA, HICA.H.CM2 CEE, CEEA.1977.3.3, European Council, 6 December 1977, press conference. 
83 CMA, HICA.H.CM2 CEE, CEEA.1977.1.6, Sail for Europe to Callaghan, 25 March 1977. 
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Legitimising European integration 
 
The issue of democratic legitimacy in the EEC provided a window of opportunity for the 
European Council to become a central institution of Europe’s governance. The legitimacy 
issue in European integration has given rise to a wide debate in political science.84 The Lisbon 
Treaty, the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008, and the subsequent Eurozone crisis in 
2009 induced multiple reforms at EU level that further revived this debate.85 The 2014 
European Parliament elections, the appointment process of the new Commission’s president, 
and the question of the European Central Bank’s (EBC) accountability are chief examples of 
this.86 In analysing the EU’s democratic legitimacy, Peter Lindseth argues that there is a                                                         
84 For a recent overview, taking into account a longer time-span, see Claudia Schrag Sternberg, The Struggle for 
EU Legitimacy: Public Contestation, 1950-2005 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). See also Andrew 
Moravcsik, 'Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union', JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 40, 4 
(2002), 603–624; Andreas Follesdal and Simon Hix, 'Why There Is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response 
to Majone and Moravcsik', JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 44, 3 (2006), 533–562; Vivien A. 
Schmidt, 'Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited: Input, Output and ‘Throughput,’' 
Political Studies, 61, 1 (2013), 2–22; Giandomenico Majone, 'Europe’s ‘Democratic Deficit’: The Question of 
Standards', European Law Journal, 4, 1 (1998), 5–28; Fritz Wilhelm Scharpf, Governing in Europe Effective 
and Democratic? (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); Myrto Tsakatika, 'Governance vs. 
Politics: The European Union’s Constitutive ‘democratic deficit', Journal of European Public Policy, 14, 6 
(2007), 867–885. For a historical perspective on the concept, see Martin Conway and Peter Romijn, 
'Introduction', Contemporary European History, 13, 04 (2004), 377–388. 
85 On the post-2008 analysis, see in particular a special issue of the JCMS: Michael Blauberger, Sonja Puntscher 
Riekmann and Doris Wydra, eds., 'Symposium: Conventional Wisdoms Under Challenge - Reviewing the EU's 
Democratic Deficit in Times of Crisis', JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 52, 6 (2014). 
86 A recent discussion of these issues can be found in Antoine Vauchez, Démocratiser l’Europe (Paris: Seuil, 
2014). 
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“seeming disconnect between supranational regulatory power on the one hand, and national 
democratic and constitutional legitimacy on the other.”87 Lindseth explains that a number of 
mechanisms attempt at bridging this gap. The European Council, albeit Lindseth does not 
develop extensively this point, arguably represents one such. The European Council 
accomplished this in two different ways. First, the European Council was an attempt at 
bringing some coherence to the two dimensions of European integration, that is, Community 
and intergovernmental affairs; second, the European Council’s two central functions – 
arbitration and orientation – were not necessarily about actually controlling supranational 
developments, but also about legitimising them. 
 
As mentioned above, the European Council was a hybrid institution active in two areas: 
Community affairs (the Treaties of Rome) and intergovernmental affairs (political 
cooperation, among which EPC). The European Council represented an attempt at making 
more coherent European cooperation processes, as the 1974 Paris summit communiqué made 
plain. This is indeed a reason why many actors who could have been opponents to the 
European Council in fact supported this institution. The European Commission and the 
smaller member states were, for instance, in this case.88 Because of the European Council’s 
capacity to launch new projects, European Council members saw themselves as part of a 
potential European government. This point was very clearly articulated by Giscard, Schmidt 
                                                        
87 Peter L. Lindseth, Power and Legitimacy: Reconciling Europe and the Nation-State (Oxford; New York, 
N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2010), 12. 
88 See the European Union Report of 1975, produced by the European Commission, and the Tindemans Report 
of 1976, written by Belgian prime minister Leo Tindemans. 
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and Wilson as early as in July 1975.89 Finally, if we consider that the European Council was 
part of an attempt at making the overall EEC/EU institutional structure more understandable 
to European citizens, it could also be argued that it contributed to an improvement of the 
democratic legitimacy of the whole system.90 
 
Besides this attempt at improving the coherence between the various strands of European 
cooperation, European Council meetings represented an effort, although in a modest fashion, 
to get European governance closer to European citizens; or at least to increase public scrutiny 
over European governance, as the next section will show. After a few years of functioning, 
some leaders noted that the meetings always took place in the capitals, and therefore 
endeavoured to gather outside of these classic venues. At the end of the European Council 
meeting held in Brussels in December 1977, “All the heads of government had agreed that 
(…) [they] should not meet in capitals, but in secluded venues, with no teams of officials 
present.”91 True, part of the motivation of this move was to try to return to the informal 
fireside chat that these meetings were originally meant to be. The European Council meeting 
held in Fontainebleau in 1984 clearly falls into that category, which recalls the Rambouillet 
G7 1975 template. But it was also a way for the EEC heads of government’s meetings to 
avoid being only perceived as a top-level gathering not interested in economic realities 
beyond official capitals. And indeed the meetings that were not held in capitals, were not held 
– Fontainebleau apart, surrounded by a forest and with only around 15000 inhabitants – in 
what could be described as “secluded venues”: Bremen (1978), Strasbourg (1979), Venice                                                         
89 Bundesarchiv Koblenz (hereafter BAK), B136/17144, Note of Schmidt, EG-institutionelle Ergebnisse meiner 
Vier-Augen- Gespräche mit Premierminister Wilson und Staatspräsident Giscard d’Estaing am 24. Juli bzw. 26. 
Juli 1975, 27 July 1975. 
90 Werts, The European Council, 1992, 192. 
91 TNA, PREM16/1640, Discussion between heads of government after dinner on 5 December 1977. 
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(1980), Maastricht (1981), Stuttgart (1983), Milan (1985) and The Hague (1976, 1986). The 
effectiveness of such a strategy may be open to debate, but the effort was clear, and not 
negligible overall, as figure 4 shows. 
 
 
Figure 5 – Number of European Council meetings held in capitals, non-capitals and in 
Brussels, 1975-198692 
 
Finally, as the previous section made plain, the European Council contributed to trigger 
greater media attention and greater involvement of civil society in the integration process. In 
that sense, the fact that the European Council predominantly talked about macroeconomic 
issues played a major role, since it was a way to legitimise coordination at a European level in 
order to overcome the different economic difficulties. The European Council contributed to 
the existence and liveliness of debates about economic convergence and monetary stability, to 
name but a few, by bringing to the agenda regular discussions on these matters. This was an 
important move, as it was instrumental in increasing the politicisation of the integration 
process, and in balancing the power of independent institutions such as the European                                                         
92 A distinction is made here between Brussels understood as the capital of Belgium (EEC member state) and 
Brussels as the EEC capital (author’s calculations).  
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Commission and the European Court of Justice.93 In short, the media salience of the European 
Council increased the level of scrutiny directed at the European level of decision-making. 
 
In discussing the disconnect between supranational integration and constitutional/democratic 
legitimacy, Lindseth makes an important distinction between control – a power to influence a 
specific policy direction – and legitimation – an oversight mechanism, a democratic 
connection.94 Interestingly the two key functions of the European Council, orientation and 
arbitration, were more about legitimation than control. The European Council provided an 
oversight mechanism run by EEC heads of government, rather than a direct control exercised 
by member states’ chief executives. The European Council’s arbitration function refers to its 
capacity to act as an EEC referee able to settle a dispute which could not be resolved at 
another institutional level. The British renegotiation settled at the European Council in Dublin 
in March 1975, the 1978 EMS negotiations, and the British budgetary dispute at the European 
Council in Fontainebleau in 1984 can count among the most prominent examples. 
Admittedly, part of the arbitration function was indeed about controlling the eventual 
outcome of the last stages in a given negotiation. But it was also believed that the highest 
political authorities could more effectively – and more legitimately – settle disputes which 
had not been resolved elsewhere.95 Heads of government were perhaps less inclined than 
individual ministers to be dominated by sectorial interests. Agriculture or finance ministers                                                         
93 For a wider discussion on the role of independent institutions in European integration, see Vauchez, 
Démocratiser l’Europe. 
94 Lindseth, Power and Legitimacy, 21-22. 
95 It should also be noted that part of the European Council’s own legitimacy in the EEC institutional set-up 
comes from the fact that it always respected the Treaties of Rome. Without any doubt, this explains why smaller 
member states and the European Commission never really opposed the emergence of the European Council in 
the 1970s and 1980s. 
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were and are frequently accused of being influenced by various lobbies. Again, this is not to 
say that heads of governments were perfectly neutral; rather, it is to highlight that their 
involvement was seen, from the mid-1970s, as a useful improvement of the EEC decision-
making process since prime ministers could take a more global, comprehensive view over 
specific issues. This was even more so the case since foreign ministers, who had previously 
been expected to perform this generalist role through the Council, could no longer perform it 
effectively because of the ever higher technicality of the issues at stake in Brussels. The EMS 
negotiations highlighted this point very well, since the both the general affairs Council and 
the finance council had been unable to reach an agreement. Heads of government were able, 
to a certain extent, to hold in balance different national concerns and interests in a way that 
sectoral ministers could not. 
 
The European Council’s orientation function, as explained in more detail above, refers to its 
capacity to provide overall guidance to the endeavours of the EEC. One of the reasons 
explaining the creation of the European Council was the widespread perception of a lack of 
leadership in the EEC – a “leaderless Europe” as Hayward put it much later96 – and more 
importantly the lack of a long-term political view. Chief executives would be able to bring 
this general guidance, instead of leaving this only and solely in the hands of the Commission. 
This function could already be seen at The Hague (ad hoc) summit of 1969 for instance, 
which advanced the idea of “widening, deepening and enlargement”, and identified a number 
of new policy areas to be developed. The creation of the European Council showed the 
willingness of the EEC’s chief executives to regularise this state of affairs. 
 
                                                        
96 Jack E. S. Hayward, Leaderless Europe (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
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These attempts at bridging the “democratic disconnect” did not prevent the European Council 
from suffering severe criticisms. Was a summit to reach a significant result, the decision taken 
could be criticised as undemocratic/illegitimate. This was for instance a criticism voiced after 
the creation of the EMS in 1978. During the Brussels European Council, Callaghan started 
out his intervention by carefully noting that, in order to respect the powers of the British 
Parliament, he would ask to replace the sentence “the European Council decided” by “agreed 
as follows.”97 An earlier Cabinet meeting, on 26 October, had raised similar questions about 
the role of the European Council: “The procedure by which the EMS proposal had been 
developed also deserved discussion. It had originated in a Franco/German initiative and there 
seemed to have been a commitment in principle at the European Council. This raised 
questions both of collective Cabinet responsibility and of the role of the European Council 
under the Rome Treaty. The constitutional implications of any limitation on the 
Government’s freedom to decide its exchange rate policy would also need to be 
considered.”98 The legitimacy and the democratic character of the European Council’s 
procedures were thus called into question. Conversely, were a summit not to reach any 
particular decision, it would be seen as a failure. The absence of decision taken would then 
nurture the feeling of an impotence of political leaders, thereby calling into question the 
legitimacy, if not the usefulness, of their regular meetings. Overall therefore, decisions and 
absence of decisions could potentially call into question the legitimacy of the European 
Council’s efforts – and nurture the argument about the EEC’s democratic deficit. 
 
                                                        
97 Centre des Archives diplomatiques de Nantes (hereafter CADN), Représentation permanente de la France 
auprès de la CEE (hereafter RPCEE), 1167, PV (Conseil) de la session du Conseil européen tenue à Bruxelles 
les 4 et 5 décembre 1978. 
98 TNA, CAB/128/64/16, 26 October 1978, 4. 
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The French constitutional court provided interesting reflections as to the European Council’s 
role in the EEC polity. In 1978, a number of French MPs argued that a treaty signed without 
having respected the French Fifth Republic’s constitution had instituted the EMS. In a 
decision on 29 December, the French Conseil constitutionnel stated that the European Council 
does not take “decisions” but reaches political agreements. The Conseil constitutionnel 
explained that  
“by a resolution on 5 December 1978, the European Council has planned for the 
creation of the European monetary system (...) and has outlined its broad orientations; 
this resolution constitutes a declaration of a political character and not (...) a treaty of 
an international agreement having by itself legal effect. (...) following this resolution it 
is the responsibility of the European Economic Community and, should the case arise, 
the national authorities to take the necessary measures to the establishment of a new 
European monetary system within the framework of their respective competencies and 
according to the appropriate rules.”99  
 
In other words, the European Council took only an orientation, not a decision. The decision 
legally fell under the responsibility of other institutions, in that case, the Council of Ministers 
and the Committee of Governors. 
 
The European Council’s activity was hence not so much about actually controlling 
supranational developments. It was rather an attempt at using the heads of government’s 
legitimacy in order to act as a referee (arbitration) and to provide overall guidance to the 
development of European integration (orientation). European Council meetings not only 
contributed to increase the level of public interest in the European integration process; they 
also represented an attempt at reconciling supranational integration and the intergovernmental 
method.  
                                                        
99 Conseil constitutionnel, Décision n°78-99 DC du 29 décembre 1978, http://www.conseil-
constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/les-decisions/acces-par-date/decisions-depuis-1959/1978/78-
99-dc/decision-n-78-99-dc-du-29-decembre-1978.7697.html, accessed 15 August 2014. My translation. 
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Conclusions 
 
The emergence of the European Council from 1975 to 1986 is a good illustration of how ever 
more complex policy-making in the EEC polity had become. Not only had a new central 
institutional actor emerged, but also the traditional dichotomies – intergovernmental vs. 
transnational/supranational; Community vs. political cooperation – became increasingly 
blurred.100 The European Council’s lack of a formal codified constitution, in the continental 
European sense, proved a source of strength for its institutional development in this context. It 
allowed the European Council to smoothly and rapidly establish itself as an indispensable 
EEC institution, well before its formal consecration by the Lisbon Treaty in 2007. Being a 
hybrid institution, the European Council contributed to overcome the classic – but largely 
artificial – dichotomy between supranational integration and intergovernmental bargaining. 
The European Council embodied the increasing interconnections between Community and 
intergovernmental affairs. Luuk van Middelaar called this the “intermediate sphere” in his 
recent history of European integration.101 In a 2010 speech, German chancellor Angela 
Merkel referred to the intertwining of the supranational and intergovernmental method as the 
“Union method.”102 This method, according to the German Chancellor, is “a combination of 
the community method and coordinated action by member states,” that is, an                                                         
100 On the specific case of EPC see Jakob C. Øhrgaard, '‘Less than Supranational, More than Intergovernmental’: 
European Political Cooperation and the Dynamics of Intergovernmental Integration', Millennium - Journal of 
International Studies, 26, 1 (1997), 1–29. 
101 Luuk van Middelaar, The Passage to Europe: How a Continent Became a Union (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 2013), 18-24. 
102 Speech of Angela Merkel at the College of Europe, 2 November 2010, available online at 
http://www.coleurope.eu/template.asp?pagename=speeches, accessed 16 June 2015. 
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intergovernmental method. In “consider[ing] it essential to ensure progress and overall 
consistency in the activities of the Communities and in the work on political co-operation,” 
the EEC heads of government gathered in Paris in December 1974 called for something very 
similar. Being situated at the crossroads of Community affairs and political cooperation, the 
European Council did (does) not fit so easily into the intergovernmental box, as it had 
complex interconnections, and influences, over the supranational integration process and 
transnational non-governmental actors, as this article has shown. 
 
This certainly constitutes a challenge to the international historian. It further confirms the 
need for a multilingual, multi-archival research. Methodologically, it calls for a greater 
consideration of macroeconomic issues.103 The European Council, as much as the G7 for the 
West, represented an attempt at coordinating macroeconomic policies in the EEC, and this 
international political economy dimension deserves to be scrutinised more closely, not least 
due to its longer-term economic, political and societal impact. It finally stresses the need for a 
reconciled, qualified interpretation not only of the role of the European Council itself in 
European integration, but also of the interplay between intergovernmental, supranational and 
transnational actors at work in European cooperation processes, rather than their isolated, 
compartmentalised, study.  
 
 
 
                                                        
103 For a recent reflection on the state of the historiography in this respect see Laurence Badel, 'Milieux 
économiques et relations internationales: bilan et perspectives de la recherche au début du XXIe siècle', 
Relations internationales, 157, 2 (2014), 3–23. 
